8

THE SUPPOSED REALISM OF THE *TRACTATUS*

On the face of it we have in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* the classic statement of a realist semantics. In his picture theory an explanation is given of how propositions have sense, i.e. are true or false, which immediately invokes ontological categories. He tells us:

> The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives.
>
> (4.0312)

and further,

> One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are combined with one another. In this way the whole group – like a tableau vivant – presents a state of affairs.
>
> (4.0311)
>
> A proposition or a picture is the fact that its elements are combined in a certain way: it says something because those elements are correlated with objects in the world.
>
> These correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture's elements, with which the picture touches reality.
>
> (2.1515)

In a proposition, in the ideal case, the elements are of course names. Their meaning (*Bedeutung*) is identical with the objects they stand for (*vertreten*). There is no trace here, for these names, of the distinction that Wittgenstein was later to draw between *Träger* (bearer) and *Bedeutung*, according to which one could say that Herr Schmidt was the *Träger* of the name Schmidt, but not, I think, that he was its *Bedeutung*.

We are naturally inclined to attribute to Wittgenstein, therefore, a theory on the following lines. Propositions have sense, i.e. are either true or false, because the following is a conceivable series of events for every one of them: first, a set of names or simple signs (that is to say signs no

parts of which function as signs) is correlated with a set of objects by ostensive definition. Second, some of these names are put into a relation which is possible for them. It happens that any relation which is possible for the names is possible also for the objects with which the names have been correlated. The fact that the names stand in the relation in question will then be a proposition to the effect that the objects also stand in that relation. Now, one of two states of affairs holds, either the objects are so related or they are not. Whichever of these two is the fact must be compared with the proposition, and if it corresponds, the proposition will be true. However, it will be seen that it can only be either true or false. Thus given that every proposition could in theory be constructed in the way described, it will be seen that every proposition will be either true or false and what its being true or false consists in. It is this that a semantic theory should establish for us.

Now many features of this account are not in Wittgenstein at all. He does not mention ostensive definition – he was to say later that its nature was unclear to him at the time of the *Tractatus*. Nor does he talk as if names just happened to permit of precisely those combinations that were possible for the objects they represented, as it were by some lucky power of our minds. This Hertz seems to suggest when he says:

> We make for ourselves inner pictures or symbols of outer objects, and we make them in such a way that the consequences of the pictures that are necessary for our thought are also at the same time pictures of the consequences that are naturally necessary for the objects depicted. In order that this requirement should be capable of being fulfilled, there must be certain correspondences already in existence between nature and our mind.[1]

Wittgenstein took much of his notion of picturing from Hertz, but not, so far as I can see, this part. Ostensive definitions and a coincidence in the capacity to form relations are introduced into Wittgenstein's account only by interpretation, and should be viewed critically.

What he certainly seems to assume, and what this account of his views is right in presupposing, is a magazine of objects which form, in one sense, the realm of *Bedeutung*. The objects assumed are simple in a much stricter sense than that given above for the simplicity of signs, and one consequence of their simplicity is that they are common to all possible worlds. They form the substance of the world or the form of the world. They are what is unalterable and persistent (*bestehend*), while the configuration of

1 Hertz 1894, p. 1. English translation supplied by the author.

objects, the states of affairs, are what varies from one possible world to another. These configurations of objects, these states of affairs, give objects what material or external properties they have. Naturally, there is only one set of configurations that is actually realized, and this is what we call reality or the world. The internal properties of objects are their possibilities of combination with one another, and the possession of these properties is necessary, not a mere matter of fact.

What is meant by assuming a magazine of objects of this kind? Clearly not that something exists which might not exist. All unrealized possibilities are simply dispositions of objects different from that which actually obtains. To put the same matter in another way, all questions of existence are questions about what configurations of objects actually obtain. Thus we might say that all existence is a matter of fact, a matter of what is in the world. This corresponds to an early statement in the *Tractatus*: The world is a totality of facts, not of things. (1.1)

This seems to yield a moderately complicated ontology: the world or reality consists of facts, that is to say in the *Bestehen* (in one sense), the obtaining, of states of affairs. States of affairs themselves, on the other hand, are combinations of objects, which *bestehen* or exist (subsist) in another sense. Existence as normally spoken of is equivalent to the *Bestehen* in the first sense of a certain state of affairs. Professor Black suggests that this ontology was suggested to Wittgenstein by his views about language.[2]

Now, to be sure, the attraction of the opening pages of the *Tractatus* is that they seem to derive substantial and metaphysical results like those long hoped for from philosophy, all on the basis of some quite natural assumptions about propositions being true or false. However, I agree with Mr Rhees[3] that it is important not to be misled by these opening pages. It was not Wittgenstein's intention to base a metaphysics upon logic or the nature of our language. He was not saying that there is something by which our grammar is determined, and therefore he did not try to infer features of the world from our language. It may seem, indeed, that he argues that propositions with sense are possible only because some more primitive operations are possible – notably the correlation of names with objects, and it may seem that he goes on to argue that these more primitive operations are possible only because the world possesses certain characteristics. However, it will be clear on reflection that such arguments would be the sort of metaphysics that he condemns.

2 Black 1964, p. 8.
3 Rhees 1970, pp. 24f.

How then are we to account for the ontological parts of the *Tractatus*? This is a larger form of our earlier question, what is it for objects to subsist (*bestehen*) as this is understood in the *Tractatus*? Still more generally the question might take the form, what is Wittgenstein doing in the *Tractatus*? I have so far been saying merely what he is *not* doing. Some interpretation is clearly needed. The answer here is that he is doing logic and basing philosophy on it. He thinks and says that philosophy is not a science alongside the others, but is something over or beneath them. Yet occasionally he speaks of philosophy or logic as if it were a science with its own range of data or facts. Thus, for example, in the middle of 2.0121 he says: 'Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts'.

I want to say that there we have a transferred and strictly illegitimate use of the word 'fact', and that similarly the whole ontology is a transferred and illegitimate use of words like *bestehen*. It is a kind of ontological myth that he wants to give us to show us the nature of language. As is well-known, one of the chief results of the view of language so attained is the rejection of all such myths.

I say that Wittgenstein is doing logic and basing philosophy on it. It is important to see what this means. When Russell wrote to him with some questions about the *Tractatus*, then a mere typescript newly arrived in England, Wittgenstein wrote:

> I'm afraid you haven't got hold of my main contention to which the whole business of logical propositions is only a corollary. The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (*gesagt*) by propositions – i.e. by language – (and which comes to the same thing what can be *thought*) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown (*gezeigt*); which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.[4]

Philosophy, it will be remembered, is thought of as a critique of language – it is the activity of making clear the limits of language, which are identical with the limits of thought. It is a pointing to, or an attempt to make clear, something that cannot be stated directly, since it is not one half of a contradiction, not one of two mutually exclusive alternatives. What philosophy tries to make clear is not sayable, but it is shown by ordinary propositions that can be true or false. Conversely, a mistaken philosophy will be the attempt to say these things. Logic comes in, in the first place, because it was Wittgenstein's starting-point: its propositions were the first

4 *CL*, p. 124.

that he discovered to say nothing but to show something – to show: '… the formal – logical – properties of language and the world' (6.12).

He wants to bring out in the *Tractatus* that philosophy and logic have to do not with a special realm of objects but with the necessary features of language – that is to say of any language whatsoever. This happens most clearly in the case of logic. The propositions of logic, the tautologies, are by various devices shown to be inevitable offshoots or by-products of the activity of saying anything true or false. As such they show us something about what it is to say something true or false.

It is in order to reach this result that Wittgenstein must say what it is for a proposition to be true or false in the ordinary way, and in the course of doing that he gives the semantic theory we described at the beginning. There can be propositions which are always true or always false – i.e. tautologies and contradictions, because there are propositions which may be true and may be false, and this is so because it is possible for a proposition to exist which *may* be false, but which, if not false, is true. I will not argue that connection here. For our present purposes – which is the derivation of objects – I wish to take it as a premise. Wittgenstein's thought is that in order for there to be propositions that may be either true or false, but must be one of the two, there will have to be a possibility of expressing those propositions by means of signs which of themselves will serve to express a proposition independently of what is the case. A state of affairs cannot be designated independently of whether it exists or not unless signs can be used whose significance could be given and understood and determined without reference to the obtaining or non-obtaining of that state of affairs. This can be done only if, in order to say that a state of affairs exists, it would be possible to produce a complex of signs. A simple sign could be correlated with a state of affairs only by revealing or assuming the existence of the state of affairs. It follows that in order to make a statement which would have sense, i.e. be either true or false, whatever the case in the world was, it would be necessary to suppose that in principle that statement could be made by the use of signs which could function in a proposition whatever the case in the world was.

Now Wittgenstein believed (and I think there are good grounds for thinking him correct, though it is not my purpose to argue it here) that we could make statements knowing them to be either true or false whatever the case in the world was. He therefore thought that we were committed to the possibility of those propositions being expressed in such a form that all the constituent signs used could function in that particular combination whatever the case in the world was. They would therefore (those supposedly possible signs) be possible constituents in propositions or possible contributors to producing a true or false proposition, regardless of what was the case in the world. He did not necessarily suppose us

to have produced signs with these characteristics, as our actual signs may depend for their meaning on all sorts of accidental circumstances, but he thought us committed to the possibility of rephrasing all that we want to say with the use of such signs alone.

Such signs, I believe, were Wittgenstein's names, and you will notice that in sketching an argument for their possibility I have made no reference to the complexity of a state of affairs or to the fact that 'objects' figure in a state of affairs. Wittgenstein does indeed mention that states of affairs are combinations of objects and introduces objects themselves into his *Tractatus* before he says anything about the necessity for a proposition to be articulated and to consist of simple signs, but I believe that the order of his exposition reverses the order of his thinking.

It will be evident to those who have read Professor Tugendhat's article on Frege in *Analysis* (Tugendhat 1970) or Mr Dummett's criticisms of it in his book on *Frege*,[5] that I am suggesting an interpretation of Wittgenstein rather like Tugendhat's of Frege. An object in the *Tractatus* which is the reference of a name or simple sign can be viewed as simply the truth-value potential of a certain expression. The semantic role of the supposedly possible simple sign or name is that of being combined with other simple signs or names to produce a proposition having a truth-value. Any sign which in the same combinations will produce exactly the same truth-values is the same sign or has the same reference. Another parallel with the view I am advocating is the conclusion reached by Miss Ishiguro in her article on 'Use and Reference of Names'[6] when she says that *Bedeutung* is an intentional notion in the *Tractatus*. In her view the existence of objects adds no extra content to the logical theory.

I shall have occasion shortly to disagree with some points she makes, but one powerful argument she uses I can adopt. She points to Wittgenstein's repeated use of the Fregean slogan – 'only in the context of a proposition does a name have a reference' – and interprets this as meaning that reference cannot be determined independently of how we settle or understand sense. To understand the reference of a name is to know something about the truth-conditions of some propositions. By this Miss Ishiguro does not merely mean (like Miss Anscombe in her *Introduction*) that there is no point in attaching a reference to a name unless you are going to go on to use that name in a proposition. She means, rather, that it is a fundamental idea of the *Tractatus* that there is no securing of reference prior to occurrence in a proposition. To show this she points out, quite correctly, that objects as spoken of in the *Tractatus* cannot be identified by a definite description or picked out by

5 Dummett 1973, pp. 199–203.
6 Ishiguro 1969, pp. 20–50.

pointing, since their *Bestehen* (existence or subsistence) is supposed to be independent of what is the case. (She goes on to give an account of how reference can be secured – an account of Wittgenstein's notion of *Erläuterung* (elucidation) – with which I disagree.) The chief result of Miss Ishiguro's discussions – and a result that I think valid in any case – is that we ought not to contrast the *Tractatus* with its notion of *Bedeutung* and the *Philosophical Investigations* with its notion that the meaning is the use. Use determines reference in the *Tractatus* also – though to be sure it is only 'use for the purpose of saying something true or false', since other forms of use are not there considered.

Now, can Tugendhat's account of *Bedeutung* (whether true or false of Frege) be applied to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*? To see this I will consider some objections brought by Dummett against Tugendhat considered as an interpreter of Frege, and see whether they would hold against Tugendhat considered as an interpreter of Wittgenstein. First, however, I will indicate one point – curiously enough a linguistic point about German – in respect of which Tugendhat does not fit Wittgenstein. Tugendhat says that the rendering of *Bedeutung* by 'reference', 'denotation' and 'nominatum' suggests, what is false, that Frege meant by the *Bedeutung* of an expression the object which the expression names. Now I believe it is very clear in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* that the *Bedeutung* of a name is meant to be identical with the object named. Indeed translating '*Bedeutung*' as 'meaning', for which I am partly responsible, could be criticized on this ground alone. At the same time it is true that in the long run I wish to explain the object as an entity definable in terms of semantic equivalence.

I will discuss Dummett's criticisms of Tugendhat because disposing of the minor ones throws some light on what Wittgenstein is doing, as opposed to Frege, while the major one raises the whole issue of this paper. The minor criticisms are first that the identification of *Bedeutung* with truth-value potential (that is to say with the semantic role alone) does not at first sight allow us to distinguish between intentional and extensional contexts, or between contexts in which the name is used to refer to its indirect reference (its sense) and those in which it is used to refer to its real reference (its bearer). '… there would be a natural presumption', Dummett says, 'in favour of a uniform semantic treatment for all contexts'.[7] That is, however, precisely what Wittgenstein wants, and he does indeed allow no distinction between intentional and extensional contexts. The reason for this can be seen by considering another form of Dummett's objection to Tugendhat. (It will be remembered that we are

7 *op. cit.*, p. 401.

here by no means criticizing Dummett's argument in itself, but only as applied to a supposed interpretation of Wittgenstein.) The second minor objection is that if reference is defined solely in terms of semantic role, or if having the same reference (*Bedeutung*) is defined in terms of interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth-value, then the use of an expression without a reference would be its use in a sentence which failed to say anything at all and failed to perform a linguistic act. What we wish to be able to say, however, is that there may perfectly well be intelligible utterances of sentences containing expressions which lack a bearer. These will differ (on Dummett's and Frege's view) from other sentences all of whose expressions of the same kind have bearers, in that the others will be and they will not be either true or false. The conception of reference as semantic role pays no attention to whether there is a bearer or not and does not allow us to call these sentences devoid of truth-value. This last is most easily done by identifying the reference with the bearer and saying that an expression may lack reference but still have sense. In virtue of its sense, a sentence in which it occurs is intelligible; in virtue of its lack of reference (bearer), a sentence in which it occurs lacks truth-value.

This may be a reason for saying that Tugendhat's account will not fit Frege, but it serves here to bring out that Wittgenstein, like Tugendhat, rejects the notion that names have both a reference and a sense. He does indeed think that the use of a name without reference results in saying nothing whatsoever. The only case parallel to those mentioned by Dummett that Wittgenstein mentions is the sentence about a *complex* that does not exist. Such a sentence does not indeed become nonsense, but simply false (3.24). As Wittgenstein said to Russell early in the development of the thoughts published in the *Tractatus*:

> Your theory of descriptions is quite certainly right, even though the objects are quite other than you imagined.[8]

The fact is that the objects he has in mind are quite different from any Russell talked of, for the same reason that the notion of 'bearer' is an odd one when applied to his names. It is inconceivable that anything which can function as a name at all should lack a bearer, just because its bearer is given with its semantic role. All that can go wrong with a name is that it may be used, or an attempt may be made to use it, otherwise than in its proper semantic role. The examples that Wittgenstein gives of this are the nonsensical propositions, 'Socrates Plato'[9] and 'Socrates is identical'.[10]

8 *CL*, pp. 56ff.
9 *NdM*, p. 115.
10 *Tractatus*, 5.4733.

They only show the sort of thing that might go wrong: 'Socrates' and 'Plato' are not real names in Wittgenstein's sense, they might lack bearers. (The case about 'identical' is more complicated than we need discuss here.) Miss Ishiguro gives a good example of the sort of name that could not lack a bearer: 'Let *a* be the centre of a circle …' In the discussion that follows, the question whether *a* exists cannot be raised. That is the sort of impossibility Wittgenstein has in mind. Of course it is true, as regards the actual example, that it may be part of an activity parasitic upon the identification of drawn figures and marked points on a sheet of paper. We have to consider what it would be like for names of this sort to form the whole substructure of language.

This brings us to the main difference between Frege in Dummett's account and Tugendhat's interpretation of Frege. Frege, Dummett says, surely with some justice, took the relation of name and bearer as the prototype of a semantic role. He assumed 'that the semantic role of every expression which is a semantically significant unit can always be construed as consisting in its relation to something in the real world'.[11] This amounts to saying that Frege makes use in his account of how our sentences have sense and reference of a number of intuitive pre-systematic notions, among them that of the relation of a name to a bearer. This comes, Dummett says, from our practice of ostension, 'from our possession, in the use of a demonstrative accompanied by a pointing gesture, of another means than the employment of a name (the text has: as a name) for picking out a concrete object'.[12] Dummett points out, surely correctly, that the notion of reference supplies us with a definite and readily acceptable picture of the semantical roles of the simplest types of expressions just because it is associated with this fundamental practice of identifying an object as the bearer of a name, and also with a fundamental practice of ostensive predication – of applying predicates to objects picked out ostensively. Now we have already seen that Wittgenstein wishes to assume no such fundamental practice, and we have claimed that he talks in the language of reference and bearer because of its attractiveness, but does not rely on the network of assumptions that make it so attractive. What we have to ask therefore is what contribution *Wittgenstein's* notion of reference makes in clarifying both what it is for us to utter sentences which are either true or false and how it is we come to do so.

We have already seen that every proposition we utter is true or false whatever is the case in the world. This demands that every proposition be capable of a full analysis in just one form, whether or not such analysis has ever been reached. If we imagine the totality of all propositions,

11 Cf. Dummett 1973, p. 405.
12 *op. cit.*, p. 406.

true and false, in their fully articulated form (which form we know to be possible in principle), then we know that every element in this articulation has meaning in the sense that it contributes to the truth-value (whatever it is) of any proposition in which it occurs. However, this is all we are saying when we say that objects form the substance of the world. Understanding those elements or becoming acquainted with those objects (the two processes are identical) does not demand any experience of what is the case, since by definition the proposition is fully analysed and hence the objects have *Bestehen* (existence or subsistence) independently of what is the case. How then do we understand a proposition? What does it require? It is interesting that the question never appears in quite this form in Wittgenstein. I believe there is a good reason for this. It is not a *feat*, not an achievement, to understand a proposition. To have in the mind a conformation or structure corresponding to that of a possible state of affairs is to understand a proposition. It will be seen at once that this amounts to saying that there is no proposition to be understood *until* there is an understanding of a proposition. Thus the question is transferred to that of how we come to understand a propositional sign. How do we think a sense into a set of words? Wittgenstein tells us:

> We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation.
>
> Thinking the sense of the proposition is the method of projection. (3.11)[13]

Thinking the sense into the proposition is nothing other than so using the words of the sentence that their logical behaviour is that of the desired proposition. Or, to look at the matter in another way, whatever logical properties we give to the words we use will determine which proposition (if any) it is that we assert by means of them. Thus we must not think of the realm of reference as a mysterious, infinitely extended magazine of things, as if they were concrete objects, with which we might or might not be lucky enough in a full life to have acquaintance by, so to speak, coming across them in a street. There is already contained in language and thought the possibility of all objects that are possible. All logical forms are logically possible within language, within thought. No separate investigation or exploration of 'reality' is conceivable.

When I say we can do anything we like with language, I mean the triviality that whatever we do with the elements of language or thought will

13 This translation differs in the last line from the rendering in the translation of the *Tractatus* (Pears and McGuinness 1971), which was justly criticized by Rush Rhees. Cf. Rhees 1970, p. 39.

have the logical consequences that it actually has. However, there is of course also the question how I learn a language, an existing language, a particular language. On this issue we have a much discussed pronouncement by Wittgenstein:

> The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known.
>
> (3.263)

Miss Ishiguro thinks that elucidations will be propositions in which the internal properties that objects possess are ascribed to them. I do not believe it is necessary to assume this. The internal properties of an object are its possibilities of combination with other objects, and these properties are shown by any ordinary proposition about that object, be it true or false. I conclude that Wittgenstein is pointing out that teaching can be earned out only by means of complete propositions or complete thoughts. The learner has to grasp these as a whole, and, when he has done that, he will have an understanding of the primitive signs contained in that proposition. I am not reverting here to the use of ostensive definitions. Propositions used in teaching meaning need not be true or concerned with the immediate environment, any more than we can claim these properties for '*Balbus aedificat murum*'.

However, whether I am right and elucidations are quite ordinary propositions, or Miss Ishiguro is right and they are more like logical propositions, the reader may wish to ask me or her: How do I know *which* object is meant by a particular sign, or *which* fact or state of affairs is stated by a particular proposition used in teaching? Surely there can be more than one object with the same logical form? With questions like this, we are in constant danger of supposing that there is some particular mental act of meaning or intending a particular thing which has to be explained. However, if I suppose two objects of the same logical form and call them *'a'* and *'b'*, and if I suppose that *'a'* has one set of material properties and *'b'* another, there is really no sense to the question whether perhaps in reality *'b'* has the set of properties I have assigned to *'a'*, and conversely. Miss Ishiguro puts this well by saying that names are in effect dummy names and can be interchanged (within the same logical form) if one does so consistently. To some extent, therefore, the question which object is meant is empty of content. In so far as it does make sense it must mean, How do I indicate to myself or to others, that I mean just the *F* that has *G*? To this question the answer is clearly that to mean this I must say it, or in other words my statement must have the appropriate overt or concealed logical multiplicity.

Perhaps Wittgenstein's fundamental point about semantics can be put by saying that only structure can represent (*darstellen*). 'Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot' (3.142).

The problem of language is the problem of the false proposition. The false proposition is possible only because it is possible for us to form a structure which will serve to express just that situation which (in saying that the proposition is false) we are supposing not to exist, and no other. It need not, and we need not judge whether it can, do this in virtue of its visible or audible form alone. However, the use of the elements of the structure must be such that only the situation in question could correspond to it. This I take to be one of the main points in the picture theory of propositional meaning. It rests on a certain insight which is compatible with some aspects of what Dummett calls realism. For Wittgenstein, as for Frege,

> … a sentence is determined as true under certain conditions, which conditions are derivable from the way in which the sentence is constructed out of its constituent words.[14]

However, the processes of explaining the truth-conditions of a proposition and of determining the truth-value of a proposition cannot be broken down into any simpler operations than that of grasping or expressing the proposition. All these operations possess the same multiplicity. Wittgenstein was to urge this point as a justification of his picture theory in the early 1930s, and it obviously also underlies the development from the *Tractatus* to the dictum that the sense of a proposition is the method of its verification.

However, if, after all, objects are required by Wittgenstein's theory of language, then why should we not call him a realist in respect of them? The answer is that Wittgenstein's objects are not concrete objects which may sensibly be said to exist or not. Nor are they properties of concrete objects, since that makes the self-contradictory assumption that there is something simpler than the simplest thing that can be referred to. Miss Ishiguro makes them 'like' instantiations of simple properties, and that is certainly the model that Wittgenstein himself used in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Relative to the language there described those instantiations are simple, but it is easily seen that an example of an absolutely simple object cannot be given. We cannot grasp anything other than a concatenation of objects.

14 Cf. Dummett 1973, p. 194.

The answer to the question about realism then, is: Wittgenstein does indeed subscribe to the view Dummett attributes to Frege:

> … the thoughts we express are true or false objectively, in virtue of how things stand in the real world – the realm of reference – and independently of whether we know them to be true or false (of whether we exist or can think at all);[15]

however, from Wittgenstein's point of view the words 'the realm of reference' are a misnomer here. I have previously called it a myth, but I might equally call it rhetoric, to say as Dummett does:

> … we do actually succeed in speaking about the actual objects, in the real world, which are the referents of the names we use, and not about any intermediate surrogates for or representations of them.[16]

Certainly, our propositions in the last analysis are not about the workings of our own minds: what Wittgenstein is trying to convey is a point of view according to which what they are about is not in the world any more than it is in thought or in language. Objects are the form of all these realms, and our acquaintance with objects (our contact with them, to borrow the metaphor of Aristotle's *hoion thinganein*) is not an experience or knowledge of something over against which we stand. Thus it is not properly experience or knowledge at all. Objects are *eti epekeina tes ousias* (beyond being, Plato's phrase this time), and it is therefore misleading to regard Wittgenstein as a realist in respect of them. His position is one, as indeed he tells us, from which realism, idealism and solipism can all be seen as one. That remark, however, deserves a separate investigation.

15 *op. cit.*, p. 198.
16 *op. cit.*, p. 196.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Manuscripts (MSS) and typescripts (TSS) are referred to under the numbers given in 'The Wittgenstein Papers' in von Wright 1982.

Briefe	*Briefe, Briefwechsel mit B. Russell etc.*
BüF	'Bemerkungen über Frazers *The Golden Bough*'
CL	*Cambridge Letters*
C&V	*Culture and Value*
Db	*Denkbewegungen, Tagebücher 1930–32*
FB	*Familienbriefe*
LCA	*Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics*
LE	'Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics'
LF	'Logical form'
'LPA'	'Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung' (1921)
LPA	*Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (1989)
LH	*Ludwig Wittgenstein–Ludwig Hänsel: eine Freundschaft*
Nb	*Notebooks 1914–16*
NdM	'Notes dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway'
Nl	*Wittgenstein's Nachlass*
NL	'Notes on Logic'
OC	*On Certainty*
PhG	*Philosophical Grammar*
PhI	*Philosophical Investigations*
PhO	*Philosophical Occasions*
PhR	*Philosophical Remarks*
PT	*Prototractatus*
RoF	*Remarks on Frazer's* Golden Bough
TLP or *Tractatus*	*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*
WVC	*Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*